Africa at the Centre of the Transition Economy
The global energy transition is shifting industrial power in real time, and Africa is at the heart of it. Since my presentation in January 2025, the continent’s role in the global transition economy has become even clearer. As electrification accelerates and demand for critical minerals reshapes industrial strategy, Africa has moved from the margins to the centre of new supply chains.
Meanwhile, Europe has hesitated. While the UK and EU debated strategies and policies, others acted. China, the United States, and African institutions have stepped in to seize opportunities. The outcomes of projects like Ngualla in Tanzania and Longonjo in Angola show what decisive partnerships achieve—and what delay costs. Africa is moving with clarity. The question is whether Europe will participate or continue to watch the transition economy move on without it.
Africa’s Strategic Role in the Transition Economy
The global shift to clean energy is driving unprecedented demand for rare earth elements, particularly neodymium and praseodymium (NdPr), essential for permanent magnets in electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, defence systems, and emerging technologies. Outside China, processing capacity is minimal, leaving the world’s industrial base largely empty.
Africa, home to a significant share of the world’s critical minerals, is uniquely positioned to supply and shape these new value chains. Minerals like cobalt, manganese, graphite, copper, platinum-group metals, and rare earths are disproportionately located on the continent. Between a third and two-fifths of global critical mineral reserves are in Africa. Battery chemistries, wind turbines, hydrogen technologies, grid reinforcement, industrial electrification, and advanced manufacturing all rely on African resources—not as optional extras, but as structural necessities.
China’s Dominance and Africa’s Opportunity
Geopolitically, China controls around 40% of the world’s rare earth and critical mineral reserves, along with dominant processing capabilities. These resources are not available for Western diversification and are aligned with China’s long-term strategic goals.
This reality makes Africa the most viable source of non-Chinese critical minerals. Its centrality has been shaped as much by Europe’s hesitation as by African ambition. For over a decade, the UK and EU talked about securing critical minerals and reducing dependence on China. They published roadmaps and strategies, but when African partners sought early commitment and capital, Europe froze.
The result: China advanced into projects abandoned by Western financiers. The United States aligned with African-led developments. African sovereign wealth funds and development banks stepped into roles Europe had assumed would remain theirs. Europe lost ground not to competition, but to inaction.
Case Studies: Ngualla vs Longonjo
The contrast between two African rare-earth projects illustrates the consequences of commitment—or the lack of it.
Ngualla: A World-Class Project Left Behind
Ngualla in Tanzania is a globally significant deposit with exceptional geology and straightforward engineering. Tanzania had the chance to anchor a strategic industry. Yet when Peak Rare Earths needed early financing, Western capital did not step forward.
Tanzania’s fiscal terms—a 16% free-carried government interest, 3% royalty, and limited tax incentives—added pressure that only a committed partner could absorb. Policy resets between 2017 and 2021 further slowed approvals and created uncertainty. By the time Western interest emerged, it was too late. The project drifted through its critical window, highlighting the cost of hesitation.
Longonjo: Partnership in Action
In contrast, Angola’s Longonjo project demonstrates the power of clear partnership. Angola offered stable fiscal terms, including a 2% royalty, five-year corporate tax holiday, customs duty exemptions, and investor-friendly capital allowances. Its sovereign wealth fund, FSDEA, bought equity into Pensana, aligning financial interests and signalling confidence.
When Pensana’s share price fell in April 2023, Angola maintained stability. African institutions—including ABSA and the African Finance Corporation—added commercial and technical support. The United States later aligned behind the project. Today, Longonjo is the most advanced NdPr project outside China, achieved not through Western support, but because Angola chose partnership, clarity, and consistency.
Europe’s Missed Opportunities
Europe’s hesitation cost more than African projects—it cost downstream industries that could counter China. Teesside in the UK, a planned NdPr refinery dependent on Ngualla, never materialised. Saltend, another first-of-its-kind rare-earth separation facility, stalled due to lack of upstream financing. European capital markets, despite their rhetoric on strategic autonomy, failed to fund the projects needed to realise it.
Africa’s institutions stepped in where Europe did not. Projects that could have secured Europe’s industrial future now advance without it.
Africa Moves Forward
Africa has not been harmed by Europe’s absence. The continent is adapting, partnering, and setting terms to retain value. Europe, by contrast, has forfeited influence and ceded ground to China and the United States. Supply chains are forming without it, and early influence rarely returns once lost.
Africa is no longer a passive exporter. It is defining its role in the transition economy while Europe risks becoming a permanent taker of strategic materials rather than a maker of industrial futures. The decisive decade has begun. Europe must now decide whether it intends to be part of this future or continue watching from the shore.